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EVALUATING AND IMPROVING LEGAL
PROCESSES-A PLEA FOR
"PROCESS VALUES"*
Robert S. Summerst
I
INTRODUCTION
Neglected topics sometimes call for lengthy introduction. So it
is here. Legal systems operate through various legal processes,
including processes for designating officials, for creating law, for
applying it, for enforcing remedies, and for imposing sanctions. It
is possible to evaluate not only the results of a process, but the
process, too. Consider this example:
Example (1): Bodea was a small society with a democratic legisla-
ture. An organized crime syndicate assumed control of the
* My work in this area has gone slowly. For the record, I wish to recount the following:
I treated part of the topic in a lecture at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland in April, 1965.
I later published a much-revised version of the lecture as Law, Adjudicative Processes, and Civil
Justice, in LAW, REASON ANDJUsTICE 169, (G. Hughes ed. 1969). During 1968-1969, I taught
Civil Procedure at Cornell Law School, an experience which gave more concrete focus to my
thinking about process values. During 1970-1971, I revised my teaching materials for
undergraduate courses about law and included five sections on "Process Values". See R.
SUMMERS & C. HOWARD, LAW, ITs NATURE, FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS 98-102, 168-85, 265-68,
351-57, 426-32 (2d ed. 1972). During 1973-1974, I co-authored a booklet of public school
teaching materials entitled: PROCESS VALUES-How OUR LAW DOES ITS JOBS ALSO COUNTS,
in R. SUMMERS, A. CAMPBELL & J. BOZZONE, JUSTICE AND ORDER THROUGI LAw (1974).
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. B.S. 1955, University of Oregon; LL.B.
1959, Harvard University; on leave, 1974-1975 at Oxford University, Oxford, England.
The author is especially grateful to Professor David Lyons of the Department of
Philosophy, Cornell University, for his many helpful suggestions in the preparation of this
Essay. The author is also indebted to colleagues who, as participants in the Cornell Law
School Faculty Research Seminar, offered valuable criticisms of an early draft. In addition,
the author wants to record his appreciation for encouragement and suggestions provided by
other persons who either read the manuscript or reacted orally to its central thesis:
Professors Rudolph B. Schlesinger, Kurt L. Hanslowe, A. H. Campbell, John C. McCoid,
Herbert W. Titus, Harry Pratter, and Mr. Geoffrey Marshall. The author is also grateful for
the helpful reactions of former students, too numerous to identify by name. Finally, the
author wishes to thank Ms. Pamela Cummings for prolonged and highly proficient secretar-
ial work on the Essay, cheerfully done.
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legislature and secured enactment of a law that for a time
abolished police forces. This disrupted the peace of Bodea and
left its people insecure.'
It will be apparent that in Example (1) both the lawmaking
process and its results were bad. Its results were bad partly because
they disrupted peace and security, high values in any legal system.
The process itself was bad, as a process, at least because lawmaking
processes controlled by self-serving minorities are unlikely to yield
results good for all. Such processes lack efficacy as means to good
results--"good result efficacy." Democratic legislatures, on the
other hand, have significant "good result efficacy," for they are far
more likely to yield results good for all. (This is not to say,
however, that they guarantee such results.)
Example (2): Bodea had a constitution with a bill of rights similar
to that of the United States. However, the Bodean police lost
confidence both in prosecutors and in the courts. As a result, the
police became vigilantes and undertook not merely to identify
and apprehend suspects, but also to "convict" and "punish"
them. Police invaded the homes of suspects and even tortured
them. By mistake, the police frequently "convicted and
punished" persons who were not guilty.2
It should be apparent that in Example (2) both the law-
applying process and its results were bad. Its results were bad partly
because they were unjust: punishment of the innocent is a form of
injustice. The process itself was bad, as a process, at least because
law-applying processes that fail to provide for impartial and de-
liberative fact-finding run a high risk of error. Again, such pro-
cesses lack efficacy as means to good results---"good result
efficacy."
My remarks on Examples (1) and (2) indicate how we can
evaluate process results, as results, in light of such standards as
peace, security, and justice. The evaluation of results is an impor-
tant social practice. However, it is not my objective to explore it in
this Essay.
My remarks on Examples (1) and (2) also reveal how the
process itself, as a process, can be evaluated in terms of what I call
good result efficacy. If a process is a significant means of achieving
good results, it is in that respect good as a process. The evaluation of
1 The example is not wholly fanciful. Some societies have even sought to dispense with
criminal law. See, e.g., I. LAPENNA, SOVIET PENAL POLICY 28-39 (1968) (recounting post-
revolution efforts in Russia to dispense with traditional criminal law).
2 Again, the example is far from fanciful. See R. SuMMERS & C. HOWARD, LAW, ITS
NATURE, FUNCnONS AND LiMrTs 184-85 (2d ed. 1972) (describing Sdo Paulo, Brazil, Death
Squads-off duty police who formed vigilante groups to administer criminal law).
[Vol. 60:1
LEGAL PROCESSES
a process in terms of "good result efficacy" is also an important
social practice. Although it is not my main objective here to explore
this variety of evaluation in depth, I will offer some account of it.
Is good result efficacy the only kind of value that a process can
have as a process? Return to Example (1) and assume that the
syndicate-controlled legislature happened to make laws good
for all.
In my view, this legislative process would still be bad as a
process because it displaces democratic rule. Put in affirmative
terms, a legislative process that is democratic is good in that respect
as a process, quite apart from whether it is also an efficacious means
to good results in the form of beneficial laws. For a process of this
kind serves participatory governance, a "process value." Similarly,
in regard to Example (2), it is my view that a vigilante law-applying
process would be bad as a process even if its "good result efficacy"
were high, because it is procedurally irrational (e.g., it is partial
rather than impartial), inhumane (people are tortured), and is
undignified and invades privacy. Put in affirmative terms, a law-
applying process that is procedurally rational, humane, and re-
spectful of individual dignity and personal privacy is good in those
respects as a process, quite apart from whether it is also an
efficacious means to good results (just convictions, just acquittals,
etc.). For procedural rationality, humanity, and regard for dignity
and privacy are "process values."
I use the phrase "process values" to refer to standards of value
by which we may judge a legal process to be good as a process, apart
from any "good result efficacy" it may have. I use "process value
efficacy" to refer to the capacity of a process to implement or serve
process values, as distinguished from its capacity to yield good
results ("good result efficacy"). 3 From the examples I have cited, it
should already be evident that, of those values that can qualify as
process values in my scheme of analysis, some are generically
familiar (and uncontroversial). But how these values qualify as
process values is not so familiar. And not all process values are
generically familiar in the first place.
3 Some philosophers might here prefer that I use their own terminology of "intrinsic
value" and "extrinsic" or "consequential value" to mark the distinction I am drawing
between "process value efficacy" and "good result efficacy." See generally, W. FRANKENA,
ETmics 79-94 (2d ed. 1973). However, I have chosen not to do so. Philosophers themselves
do not always use their terminology to mark the same distinction. In addition, the terminol-
ogy itself has some implications that I do not intend. For example, I do not intend "process
value efficacy" to exclude "good result efficacy." That is, a feature of a process that has the
former may also have the latter, yet to designate the former in terms of "intrinsic value"
implies the contrary for some philosophers.
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My principal thesis in this Essay is that a legal process can be
good, as a process, in two possible ways, not just one: It can be good
not only as a means to good results, but also as a means of
implementing or serving process values such as participatory gov-
ernance, procedural rationality, and humaneness. Although the
first kind of goodness is "result-oriented," it is nonetheless a form
of process-related goodness, for one process is generally preferable
to another, as a process, to the extent that it is a more efficacious
means to good results. The second variety of goodness-the extent
to which a process implements or serves process values-is exclu-
sioely "process oriented," and in this Essay I will concentrate on it.4
Why do I choose to concentrate on evaluating and improving legal
processes rather than process results, and on process value efficacy
rather than good result efficacy?
First, modern societies give far less evaluative emphasis to
processes than to results. Both in the world of thought and in the
world of action, process values fail to get their due. Thus our own
scholarly literature on process values is in a primitive state.5 Al-
though we have many books and articles on such important social
values as participatory governance, fairness, and rationality, there
is not yet a single systematic essay on how these familiar and
uncontroversial values can qualify as process values in a legal
order. In the world of action, too, process values are not only
neglected but often ignored altogether. We are ready to assume
that unless the results of our legal processes turn out bad, then "no
harm done." But if my thesis is valid, "harm" can be done merely
by disregarding process values. Surely it is bad to neglect or
4 Of course, from what has been said so far in the text, a legal process may not only be
good-have value--in the two ways I have indicated, but may also be bad-have disvalue--in
two corresponding ways. It may both lack good result efficacy and ignore or infringe a
process value. I will usually refrain from stating these negative possibilities in the text. They
can be inferred when appropriate. Occasionally I will call them "disvalues."
5 In 1970, after an extensive search, I found only one article that even seemed to
recognize the topic as a unitary subject for study. See the brilliant article by Kadish,
Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319,
346-63 (1957). As its title implies, however, its orientation is different from that of the
present Essay. As an incidental part of his article, Professor Kadish does identify and split
off one process value: "respect for the dignity of the individual." Id. at 346-47. It is some
indication of the primitive state of the literature on process values that another distinguished
law professor immediately hailed Professor Kadish's feat as a "major contribution." New-
man, The Process of Prescribing Due Process, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 215, 219 (1961). All this was
over a decade ago. As far as I can determine, there has been little since. See note 75 infra. Of
course, I do not contend that the legal literature is devoid of concern for all aspects of legal
processes as such. There are many essays on legal processes as means to desired outcomes.
8 Even Shakespeare sometimes seemed to think that only that is bad which ends bad, or
[Vol. 60:1I
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ignore such values as participation, fairness and rationality when
embodied in legal processes. Even when these values are recog-
nized and consciously weighed, they are typically overridden. But it
can hardly be true that it is always justified to override them.
Process values are not weightless. And it is especially important to
give process values their due in those circumstances, often fre-
quent, in which the standards for evaluating process results are not
clear or are not agreed upon, or the facts required for applying
agreed-upon standards are not ascertainable. In these circum-
stances, the entire "process-result" aggregate can be judged only in
terms of the quality of the process itself, and thus largely in terms
of the process values it implements or serves.
Second, an analysis of process values and their role in the
evaluation of legal processes should help clarify some distinctive
forms of social criticism. Thus it should enable us to understand
more fully what social critics frequently mean-but often fail to
articulate-when they invoke the maxim, "The end does not justify
the means," or when they condemn action as too "result-oriented."
For what such critics frequently seem to mean is that the course of
action being judged unjustifiably sacrifices process values, or worse
yet, ignores them altogether." This analysis should also render
explicit much of what lawyers, jurists, and elected officials intend to
convey when they stress the "morality of process"9 or otherwise
emphasize "legal process."10 Similarly, it should further our under-
well that ends well. Shakespeare, All's Well That Ends Well, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
SHAKESPEARE 861 (Cambridge ed. 1936). This, of course, is the only respect in which he ever
erred.
" Cf J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 83-90 (1971).
a For example, see the perceptive piece by William F. Baxter, addressed to the then
Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, Faculty and Government Roles in Campus
Unrest, in 50 EDUCATION RECORD 411 (1969), in which the "ends-means" maxim is frequently
invoked. See generally, Gomperz, When Does the End Justify the Means?, 53 ETHICS, 173
(1942-43). Admittedly, criticism that behavior is too "result oriented" may mean something
other than that the behavior sacrifices or ignores process values. For example, it may be a
criticism of those who espouse a given rationale only when it happens to serve the result they
want at the moment. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REv. 1, 10-35 (1959).
9 See, e.g., Bickel, Watergate and the Legal Order, 57 COMMENTARY 19, 25 (1974) (using
phrase "morality of process" attributed to Professor Freund).
10 See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 307 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) ("Legal process is an essential part of the democratic process.") And, for a statement by
an elected official, consider this recent example: "[Tlhe values of democracy are in large
part the processes of democracy, the way in which we administer justice, the way in which
Government deals with individuals." Address by Senator William Fulbright, University of
Arkansas at Fayetteville, April 13, 1974, in N.Y. Times, May 25, 1974 § 6 (Magazine), at 35.
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standing of the broad phrase "the rule of law," as invoked in
criticism of social action."
Third, this Essay might contribute to our understanding of the
nature of law, at least in Western democracies. Some jurispruden-
tial theorists have sought to characterize law in terms of "salient"
elements including a "value" element. Yet they have neglected
the "process value" element in legal systems. Instead, they have
stressed the values typically embodied in the non-procedural law of
a society, such as security of person and property, freedom of
contract and movement, and substantive justice.12
Fourth, the ideas presented here might qualify as a modest
contribution to contemporary moral theory, for most moral
theorists are preoccupied with utilitarian or result-oriented
evaluation. 13 Similarly, this Essay can serve as a reminder to those
many social scientists who focus their studies on processes merely
as means to good results, to the neglect of process values as such.1 4
Finally, this analysis might even contribute to the improvement
of actual legal processes. It might arouse conscious interest in
designing legal processes to implement or serve process values or
even make some officials more conscious of process values and less
disposed to "short-circuit" prescribed processes to secure desired
results (when this is unjustified). And it might help citizens more
effectively to discharge their democratic "watchdog" functions, for
to perform these functions at all well, citizens must be conscious of
the relevant values and capable of articulate criticism in their
name.15
One thing is certain: The topic is timely, at least in the United
States. The status of process values is now at low ebb here. The
excesses of the civil rights movement testify to this. The works of
the "Watergaters" are also illustrative. So, too, are student take-
overs of campus buildings. The "law-administering" and "law-
1 See, e.g., Cox, Civil Rights, The Constitution and the Courts, 40 N.Y.S.B. BULL. 161
(1968).
12 See, e.g., H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 189-95 (1961).
13 On this dominant form of evaluation, see Smart, Utilitarianism, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 206-11 (P. Edwards, ed. 1967).
14 See, e.g., Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of
Market Versus Non-Market Allocation, in STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 91ST CONG., 1ST
SESS., THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: THE PPB SYSTEM, pt. 1, at
47-67 (Comm. Print 1969); Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the
Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1972).
15. When President Nixon refused to hand over the Watergate tapes sought by then
special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, the public rose up in articulate anger, and the President
capitulated. If citizens are to be good watchdogs, this kind of articulateness is vital.
[Vol. 60:1
LEGAL PROCESSES
creating" activities involved in such forms of behavior sacrifice or
ignore process values of high importance, including participatory
governance and procedural rationality. 16
Now for some disclaimers and caveats: My purpose in this
Essay is not to undertake an analysis of the positive law of any
society. In particular, it is not my intent to survey our own
constitutional doctrines of due process, to treat such phenomena as
the Warren Court's exaltation of process over outcome in criminal
cases.' 7 My aims are jurisprudential and therefore more general.
Furthermore, I am not claiming in this Essay to have discovered a
whole new class of values called "process values." Indeed, I have
acknowledged that many of the values I call process values are
already generically familiar to us in some form or another-e.g.,
participatory governance, fairness, rationality, etc. Once we recog-
nize how such values can qualify as process values, we can readily
see some evidence of their espousal, as process values, all about
us-in legal precepts, in official pronouncements, in books and
journals on law, and even in newspapers and popular periodicals.' 8
Of course, some of the ideas presented here are not yet fully
worked out. I nevertheless offer them now, for I believe they may
stimulate useful reaction.
II
LEGAL PROCESSES AS SEPARATE OBJECTS OF EVALUATION DISTINCT
FROM RELATED PHENOMENA
In complex societies, many occasions arise to evaluate legal
processes, for those processes are both important and numerous.
In the United States, there are many varieties of processes for
designating officials, for creating various forms of law, for dis-
16 See Part V infra.
17 See generally, Wright, Must thiCriminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEXAs L.
REv. 736 (1972); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CH. L REv.
665 (1970).
18 "Once we identify legal principles as separate sorts of standards, different from legal
rules, we are suddenly aware of them all around us. Law teachers teach them, lawbooks cite
them, legal historians celebrate them." Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in EssAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 41 ( R. Summers ed. 1968). But the independent status of most process values is
not nearly so evident in our legal practices as that of legal principles to which Professor
Dworkin refers. One would think that judges, above all, would be sensitive to process values
as such. But one can find only scattered instances of explicit judicial recognition of process
values as such. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 208-09 (1962); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952); Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
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seminating, enforcing, or otherwise implementing the law, and
even for creating and modifying these processes themselves.
The overall goodness or badness of a process is a function of
specific evaluations of the various features of that process. Those
features can be found in the rules and other prescriptive legal
norms that constitute and regulate the process.19 Thus, for exam-
ple, important process features are specified in rules which pro-
vide:
1. How the process is to be commenced and who is entitled to
commence it;
2. What stages the process is to go through;20
3. The various activities that are to occur at each stage; 21
4. Who is to participate at each stage and what activities the
participants are to perform;
5. Whether there is to be any "review" of the work-
ings of the process, or any "veto" on its outcomes or the
like;
6. By what means the process is to be made
efficacious or "sanctioned";
7. How the process is to be terminated, and by
whom;
8. How process personnel are to be designated.
To illustrate the notion of "process features," we may briefly
consider a process for revoking a driver's license. The rules that
constitute and regulate such a process might specify features as
follows: commencement via service of notice on the driver of a
proposed revocation; provision for an impartial hearing in which
the driver may have the aid of a lawyer; a requirement that any
revocation decision be made only by a three member board; an
opportunity for review; and final order.
When a legal process is evaluated, the focus may be: (1) on a
specific feature which, in turn, may be either (a) regular or (b)
irregular in the particular case; or (2) on the process as a whole.
The distinction between regular and irregular features can be
readily illustrated: In our judicial processes, usually only litigants
present evidence and argument. Accordingly, this activity is what I
'9 Those interested in a philosophical account of how processes are constituted should
consult J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 3-54 (1969); MacCormick, Law as Institutional Fact, 90 LAw
Q. Rv. 102 (1974).
"0 E.g., a judicial process may have a pleading stage, a preparation stage, a trial stage,
and so on.
21 E.g., the activities in the "preparation" stage of a judicial process include discovery,
stipulation, preparation of witnesses, etc.
[Vol. 60:1
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call a "regular" feature of a judicial process. But if a judge should
cross-examine witnesses or otherwise engage in fact-finding in a
particular case, this would be what I call an "irregular" feature. A
legal process may be evaluated not only for its "positive" features
(regular and irregular) but also for what it is not-its "negative"
features. For instance, an evaluator might criticize a process for
failure to afford a right to a hearing in a certain type of case.
Before evaluating a legal process it is often necessary to do
some preliminary study. It might be necessary to determine what
the regular features of a process are and how they work. Or it
might be necessary to determine what causal impacts the process
has in terms of results. And to assess the workings of a process in a
particular case, facts concerning those workings must be ascer-
tained. Sometimes it will be difficult to determine relevant facts
about a legal process. For example, confidentiality, as in the case of
juries, may be an obstacle to effective fact-finding. Inadequacies of
social science methods may create difficulties in, for example,
determining cause and effect in penal processes.22
Legal processes should be distinguished from otber closely
related phenomena that are often objects of evaluation as well.
Thus, for evaluative purposes, a legal process must be differen-
tiated from process results. These results include immediate out-
comes, side effects, and collateral consequences. Of these, im-
mediate outcomes are most important and include designations of
officials, specific laws, applications of laws, court judgments, and
administrative orders.2 3 Such results can be evaluated _QMtheir own
22 But some important empirical work on the operations of certain types of legal
processes is now under way. See, e.g., Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias
in Legal Decision Making, 86 HARV. L REv. 386 (1972).
23 I offer the following more or less comprehensive table of types of processes from
which their corresponding "immediate" outcomes mnst be distinguished for evaluative
purposes:
Legal Processes General Types of Immediate Outcomes
A. Processes for selection of officials A. Designation of officials
elective and appointive
B. Processes for creating law B. "Creation" outcomes
1. Legislative 1. Statutes
2. Judicial 2. Precedents
3. Administrative 3. Regnlations, rulings, etc., formal
(regnlatory and executive) and informal treaties; international
agreements, etc.
4. Referenda 4. Popular enactments
5. Contracts, wills, trusts, etc. 5. Particular contracts, wills, trusts, etc.
C. Processes for publicizing and dissemi- C. "Publication" and "dissemination" of
nating law law
(Cont. on p. 10)
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terms apart from the legal processes from which they emanate. (An
evaluator may not only wish to evaluate a particular outcome, but a
series of outcomes as well.)
Side effects and collateral consequences of a process are sepa-
rable objects of evaluation, too. They include the extent to which
the process generates public confidence and respect for law and
authority, the extent to which its results are acceptable to the
parties involved, and so on.24
For evaluative purposes it is also important to differentiate a
legal process from the non-procedural law applicable within the
process. Even in law-creating processes there might be applicable
non-procedural law. For instance, a constitutional provision may
impose a duty on participants in a legislative process to enact a
certain kind of law, or to refrain from enacting a certain kind of
law.25 Of course, in a law-applying process, the very substantive law
to be applied can usually be distinguished from the process itself.
Imagine, for example, a binding substantive statute providing that
Puerto Ricans, but not blacks, can recover damages in court for
employment discrimination. If a court should apply this law to
Legal Processes General Types of Immediate Outcomes
D. Processes for applying law D. "Application" outcomes
I. Negotiation I. Settlements; plea bargains; etc.
2. Judicial-civil 2. Judgments; orders
3. Judicial--criminal 3. Convictions; acquittals
4. Administrative (executive and regu- 4. Rulings, orders, etc.
latory)
5. Self-application by private citi- 5. Decisions consistent with law (or
zens and organizations not)
E. Processes for enforcing law E. "Enforcement" outcomes
1. Civil--"common law" 1. Payment of proceeds from sheriffs
sales to judgment creditor (and the
like)
2. Civil.-"equity" 2. Fines or imprisonment for con-
tempt, etc.
3. Criminal 3. Fines or imprisonment, etc.
4. Administrative 4. License revocation and the like
5. Use of militia 5. Military detention and related
enforcement mechanisms
6. Enforcement by private citizens 6. Various "self-help" outcomes
and organizations
F. Processes for creating and modi- F. Creation and modification of pro-
fying processes cesses
24 On acceptability and associated values in adjudicative processes, see L FULLER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 706-7 (1949); Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for
Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REv. II1, 146 (1972).
25 An example of the former is the New York constitutional provision that requires the
legislature to maintain a system of public schools. N.Y. CONsT. art. IX, § 1. An example of a
constitutional provision that proscribes certain kinds of unwise laws is, of course, the first
amendment to United States Constitution.
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deny relief to a black claimant, the outcome would be bad, but this
would be traceable to the non-procedural statute, not to the judicial
process. Further, in many legal systems there is another body of
non-procedural law called the law of "evidence." This law might
obstruct the discovery of truth and therefore contribute to injf1s-
tice, but, again, the process would not necessarily be to blame. In
sum, there are several varieties of non-procedural law that can be
evaluated on their own terms, distinct from the processes within
which and to which these laws apply.
Finally, to the extent that officials have broad discretion to
perform process activities in diverse ways or to exercise ultimate
discretionary judgments in the process, it is often wise to single out
those discretionary activities and judgments as distinct objects of
evaluation, even though they are not wholly separable from the
process. For example, in adjudicative processes there arise "hard"
cases and "close" cases that call for the exercise of the art of
judging, an art which some judges perform well, others not so well.
This art of judging can be evaluated by its own distinctive
standards. 6 Votes of legislators in legislative processes are analo-
gously illustrative. These votes are often 'judgment calls," and
deserve evaluation on their own terms distinct from (though in
conjunction with) the legislative process involved.27
I am not, however, claiming that the features of legal processes
have no bearing whatsoever on the quality of discretionary exer-
cises of judgment. On the contrary, some kinds of abuse of discre-
tion can be traced directly or indirectly to deficiencies in process
design. For example, a judge might abuse his discretion because he
lacks impartiality, and this, in turn, might be attributable to a
deficiency in the process which fails to secure impartial judges.2 8
III
STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING LEGAL PROCESSES as Processes:
"GOOD RESULT EFFICACY"
Once the features of a legal process are laid bare, and once
other related objects of evaluation are identified and put aside, the
26 Many judges have written on various aspects of the "art of judging." See, e.g., B.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROGESS (1921); C. WYZANSKi, A TRIAL JUDGE'S
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (1952).
27 Legislators have sometimes written perceptively about the art of legislative judgment.
See, e.g., T. SMrrH, THE LEGISLATivE WAY OF IFE (1940). On the art of judgment in policy
making generally, see the interesting essay by G. VicKEs, THE ART OFJUDGMENT (1965). See
L. WADE & R. CURRY, A LOGIC OF PUBLIC POLICY (1970).
28 See Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALmS ON AMER GAN LAw 30 (H. Berman ed.
1961).
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standards for evaluating the process, as a process, can be considered.
These standards are: (1) the efficacy of the process as a means to
good results-its "good result efficacy"; aid (2) the process values
that the process serves, including the degree of efficacy of the
process in serving those values. Although my primary focus will be
on the latter, it is necessary to offer some account of the former, if
only to clarify my views.
In the phrase, "good result efficacy," I use "result" to include
the immediate outcomes of the process, e.g., designations of
officials, laws made, court judgments, and the like, and also the
side effects and collateral consequences of the process. As men-
tioned previously, outcomes can usually be assessed on their own
terms without reference to the processes from which they
emanate. 29 Consider, for example, the election of a public official.
His election can be judged good or bad in light of his intelligence,
his capacity for work, and the quality of his judgment. Or consider
newly enacted statutes. They can ordinarily be judged on the basis
of their contribution to public peace, to liberty, to welfare, or to
justice. Particular court decisions, too, can be judged by such
standards quite apart from the nature of the process from which
they emanate. The same is true of side effects and collateral
consequences of legal processes.
If process results, as judged on their own terms by appropriate
standards, are good, this will often be traceable partly to the process
from which they emanate. When this is so, the process is good in
that respect, as a process, for it demonstrates good result efficacy.30
Of course, the good result efficacy of a process will usually not be
the only factor contributing to the results. The quality of non-
procedural law, and of any discretionary judgment, will usually
contribute to the results, also. Indeed, these other factors will often
be equally, if not more, important than the process itself in ac-
counting for such results.31
When the causal issues are resolved and it is determined that
the process did contribute to the results, then the process may be
said to have some measure of good result efficacy. It is one thing
for a process to have this quality in a particular case, and another
for it to have it in the usual case. Obviously, it is more desirable for
a process to have general good result efficacy than for it to be only
an occasional and therefore unreliable contributor to good results.
29 See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
30 See notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra.
31 Sometimes it will not be possible to tell whetber the process contributed at all, or it
will only be possible to speculate that it did.
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It is important to note that a process might generally contrib-
ute to given results, but those results might be had. In that event,
the process would not be good as a process insofar as its result
efficacy is concerned. The good result efficacy of a process is
therefore an inherently derivative kind of value. It derives from
the goodness of process results, as results, and is in that respect
"result-oriented. '' 32
A legal process, then, may be good as a process insofar as it
contributes to good process results. And a process that generally
contributes to good results is preferred, as a process, to one that
so contributes ouly irregularly and unreliably. Processes are com-
monly judged exclusively hy such criteria. That is, insofar as a
process is considered good as a process, this is commonly by virtue
of its good result efficacy, or its efficacy in bringing about such side
effects or collateral consequences as public confidence, acceptability
of process outcome, and the like.
IV
STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING LEGAL PROCESSES as Processes:
"PROCESS VALUES" AND "PROCESS VALUE EFFICACY"
Good result efficacy is not the only kind of value a process can
have as a process. I have already indicated that a process may also be
good insofar as it implements or serves33 "process values" such as
participatory governance and humaneness.34 These forms of
goodness are attributable to what occurs, or does not occur, in the
32 The illustrative table below shows various process features in the left hand column
and the corresponding good result efficacy of the feature in the right hand column:
Process Feature Good Result Efficacy
1. Participation by party to a law-applying Better informed decision, factually and le-
process galy
2. Prohibition of torture in a criminal More reliable verdicts
process
3. Use of committees in a legislature to Better laws
study proposed laws
4. Requirement that an official grant (or Early provision of benefit where need
deny) a welfare application within 30 shown
days after receipt
'3 When a process feature is intentionally designed to further a process value, it is
appropriate to say that it "implements" that value. Many process features, however, have
evolved over time so that it is not appropriate to say they were intentionally designed to
further a process value, even though they do. Here it is not appropriate to use the word
"implement," with its "intentional" overtones. Instead, the word "serve" is used.
" See Part I supra.
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course of a process. They are thus process-oriented, rather than
result-oriented. For example, a feature of a process allowing for
participation by interested parties is generally good for that reason,
apart from whether in the end it also contributes to good results.
Similarly, a feature of a process that prohibits torture is generally
good for that reason, apart from results. These process features
implement or serve, respectively, the process values of participa-
tory governance and humaneness. Features of processes that im-
plement or serve what I call process values are prizable whether or
not they contribute to good results, though they may, of course, be
justifiably overridden.
A skeptic may quarrel with various aspects of my "process
values" thesis, or even deny the reality of process values altogether.
But I invite him to suspend judgment until the end of this section.
I will stop at that juncture and confront several skeptical attacks.
A. A Procedure for Compiling a Catalogue of Process Values
Since, in my view, features of legal processes are good insofar
as they implement or serve what I call process values, it is impor-
tant to compile a catalogue of such values for use as evaluative
standards. I have already cited several examples of process
values.35 I will now outline a general procedure for identifying
them, and will follow with the beginnings of such a catalogue.
My relatively simple procedure for identifying process values
calls for a "case by case" approach at this primitive stage of the art,
at least. Under this approach, legal processes are to be singled out
one by one and examined to determine whether their features
implement or serve values that qualify as process values. Of course,
even with this kind of "common law" approach, 6 it is necessary to
know in advance what one is seeking to identify. In my analysis, a
value qualifies as a process value if (1) it is a value that can be
implemented through, or served by, features of a legal process, (2)
it is a value that can be "realized" in the course of the workings of a
legal process rather than merely in its end results, and (3) it is a
value that can render a feature of a legal process prizable regard-
less of its effect, if any, on results. These are closely related
requirements for process value status. However, I do not assert
that there are two totally independent classes of values-process
35 See id.
31 I call it a "common law" approach because it resorts to "cases" of legal processes as
sources of standards for evaluation in a fashion somewhat comparable to that by which
courts extract law from cases.
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values and, for example, "substantive" values-with the former
inherenfly applicable only to processes and the latter only to
results. Thus, I do not claim that every value that qualifies as a
process value is inherently process-oriented in its scope and there-
fore can never properly apply to evaluate process results, as well. 37
My "common law" procedure for identifying process values
consists of ten principal steps. Briefly, they may be summarized as
follows:
STEP ONE-Single out a legal process.
Usually, it will be relatively easy to single out a legal process as
a separate object of evaluation. 38 Of course, it is not necessary that
the process singled out be an actual one. It may be purely
hypothetical, yet still serve as a "source" of process values. But to
guarantee realism it seems best, at this primitive stage of the
subject, to single out actual processes and focus on selected in-
stances of their operation.
STEP TWO-Determine the operational features of the process.
The operational features of a legal process can be found in the
constitutive and regulative rules (and other norms) that define the
process. These may be written or unwritten. Of course, the law in
books is not necessarily the same as the law in action. A sophisti-
cated observer should, however, be able to compile a list of the
rules and other norms that define the process at hand, and from
these the operational features can be readily gleaned.39
STEP THREE-Identify results of the process.
The relevant results to which a process contributes in a
selected instance or instances can usually be identified without
undue difficulty. As discussed previously, these results consist of
immediate outcomes, side effects, and collateral consequences.40
Before specific process results can be evaluated, however, they
must be specified in sufficient detail. To characterize them by type,
such as "elected official," or "law," will not be enough. Such entities
would be too insubstantial to be satisfactorily evaluated.
37 Fortunately, it is not necessary to address some of the hoarier questions in value
theory. Thus, for example, I need not explore the general criteria for deciding whether a
value is truly a value. Nor do I need to offer a theory of what values are "supreme" or
"ultimate." And, of course, it is not necessary for me to show "where the values come from"
or that they are in some sense "universal."
38 Although difficult problems of "individuating" legal processes can arise, it is not
necessary to go into them for present purposes.
31 For several illustrative examples of process features see note 32 supra.
40 See notes 23-24 supra.
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STEP FOUR-Evaluate the process results.
Once selected process results are specified in sufficient detail,
the standards appropriate to their evaluation will usually be appar-
ent. Thus, legislation abolishing police would, under ordinary
circumstances, be bad, for it would disturb peace and security. But
legislation creating a police force would be good. Similarly, en-
forcement of criminal law by vigilantes would be bad, for its
results, we may assume, would regularly include punishing the
innocent. But prohibition of vigilantism would be good, for it
would ensure against such injustice. Peace, security, and justice are
among the values appropriate to evaluating process results. Of
course, the evaluation of results as such is naturally and appro-
priately fesult-oriented rather than process-oriented.
STEP FIVE-Determine which process features, if any, contributed to
good results.
Bear in mind that various factors other than the process itself
may contribute to good results. Indeed, these other factors may be
exclusive causes. Sometimes it will be difficult to tell if a process
feature contributes at all. But if a process feature contributes in
significant measure to good results, it will have good result efficacy.
The good result efficacy of a process feature makes the process
good in that respect as a process. But this variety of process
goodness must not be confused with process values. The goodness
of good result efficacy derives from the goodness of process
results. But process values are not result-oriented at all.
STEP SIX-Determine whether any process features that have good result
efficacy are also good for other non-result-oriented reasons.
With this step, it becomes possible to identify process values.
Consider this example: Assume that an adjudicative process for
trying criminal defendants has the feature that indigents shall be
entitled to free counsel.41 Assume this feature is good because
counsel will inform the adjudicators better and thus the relevant
outcomes-i.e., convictions or acquittals-will be more accurate and
just. This feature would have good result efficacy. But might this
feature also be good for other non-result-oriented reasons?42 In
41 Cf Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
42 There are at least two relevant non-result-oriented reasons. First, a process feature
may be valuable for its own sake as a form of some process value. A feature securing
participatory governance is an example. Second, a process feature may be valuable as a
means to some other process value. For example, orderliness serves the process value of
procedural rationality.
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my view, the answer is "yes." It is good also because it furthers a
form of participatory governance. It makes the accused's participa-
tion all the more meaningful (although it will be more vicarious).
Such participatory governance is therefore good for what it is,
apart from results, and qualifies as a process value. Thus, putting
good result efficacy to one side, a "process-result aggregate" can be
good on at least two distinct counts, both traceable in part to the
same process feature: the result can be good in light of standards
for judging results (here, justice), and the process can be good in
light of relevant process values (here, participatory governance).
Note well that the goodness of the process feature (here, provision
of free counsel) does not, however, depend only on the goodness
of particular process results (here, just conviction or acquittal). The
result might happen to go awry in particular cases, and yet the
relevant process feature remain valuable for what it is, namely a
form of participatory governance.
A process feature that implements or serves a process value
may be said to have "process value efficacy." Often the same
feature will have both kinds of efficacy and imaginative and careful
analysis will be required to disentangle the two.43
STEP SEVEN-Determine whether any process features that have bad
result efficacy are nevertheless good in other ways.
This step, too, can enable us to identify process values. Some
process features may actually have bad result efficacy. For example,
processes for apprehending, convicting, and punishing criminals
may have the feature of prohibiting involuntary stomach pumping
of persons suspected of drug offenses.44 In some cases, guilt or
43 This is a possibility often overlooked. Even those who go so far as to denominate
certain procedural rules as "rules of natural justice" tend to view these rules solely as means
to good outcomes. See, e.g., H. MARSHALL, NATURALJUSTICE (1959). One might add a third
column to the table in note 32 supra to further illustrate this phenomenon:
Process Feature Good Result Efficacy Process Value Efficacy
1. Participation by party to a Better informed decision, Realization of participatory
law-applying process factually and legally governance
2. Prohibition of torture in More reliable verdicts Humaneness
a criminal process
3. Use of committees in a Better laws Procedural rationality
legislature to study pro-
posed laws
4. Requirement that an offi- Early provision of benefit Timeliness
cial grant (or deny) a wel- where need shown
fare application within 30
days after receipt
44 Cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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innocence might depend exclusively on the fruits of such stomach
pumping. Yet a flat prohibition of stomach pumping precludes
access to this evidence and thus has bad result efficacy. Does it have
any redeeming virtues? In particular, does it serve any process
values? I believe it does, for a prohibition against involuntary
stomach pumping respects individual dignity. A process feature
that respects individual dignity is good for that reason alone,
regardless of results, and thus qualifies as a process value.
Consider a second example: Many law creating bodies are
popularly elected and operate by majority rule. But it is arguable
that these features have almost as much bad result efficacy as they
have good. It is at least true that democratic legislatures create
their share of bad laws. Yet the participatory features of demo-
cratic legislatures are nevertheless good for what they are, apart
from results. They comprise a form of participatory governance
which is good for its own sake and therefore qualifies as a process
value.
STEP EIGHT-Where it is not possible to say whether process features
affect results or to tell whether affected results are good
or bad, determine whether any such features are good for
non-result-oriented reasons.
Sometimes it will not be possible to say whether process fea-
tures affect results for good or for ill. And sometimes it will not be
possible to tell whether results partly traceable to process features
are good or bad, either for lack of facts or for lack of agreed
standards. Thus, we may imagine certain designations of officials
the goodness or badness of which cannot be determined. The
officials may be politically unknown, for example. Yet the features
of the electoral process that designated the officials may provide
for a form of participatory governance-a process value.
Or, to cite another common case, a legislature may hold
hearings, deliberate, and finally enact a statute, yet it may be quite
unclear whether this law is good or bad. But the features of the
process that call for reasoned reflection and deliberation remain
good as forms of procedural rationality. Although these features
are good as a means to good results, they are also good apart from
results. Unlike random or arbitrary, or nakedly coercive process
features, procedurally rational ones are intelligible to us as applica-
tions of human reason.
STEP NINE-Compare any process value identified by the foregoing
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procedure with others already catalogued, and enter it
either as a variety of some process value already entered or
as a distinct value.
As part of this step, it will be desirable to elaborate on the
value significance or "content" of at least the less familiar entries.
Also, when different features of a single process or of different
processes implement or serve the same value, it will be useful to
note this with illustrations.
STEP TEN-Move on to another legal process (or to other operations of
the process at hand) and repeat the foregoing procedure.
By repeating this relatively simple procedure with respect to a
variety of processes, it should be possible to compile an extended
catalogue of "process values" for use in evaluating legal processes. I
have said that these values are values that (1) can be implemented
through, or served by, features of legal processes, (2) have a kind
of value significance that is realizable in the course of the workings
of legal processes rather than merely in their end results, and (3)
can render the features of those processes valuable whether or not
they contribute to good process results. I concede that the forego-
ing procedure for identifying such values is not foolproof, nor is it
without other limitations. A process singled out pursuant to this
procedure might not be one that implements or serves process
values. In that event, the procedure would bear no fruit. Also,
some persons who use the procedure may simply miss process
values that the process does implement or serve. And two different
persons will not always identify the same values by applying the
procedure to a given process. This should not be surprising, for
fruitful use of the procedure calls for fact-finding about processes,
for value sensitivity, for imaginative reflection, and for articulate-
ness. But it is not just that these capacities are unequally distributed
in our "natural lottery." Sometimes there is room for reasonable
disagreement over whether a process does serve a process value.
And until we understand ourselves better, some process values
may elude even the most sensitive, imaginative, and articulate
among us.
But for now, the foregoing procedure and the beginnings of a
catalogue (about to be presented) are all I have to offer. I hope
that others can improve on the procedure, or perhaps even fashion
an altogether different and less circuitous strategy for identifying
process values.
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B. The Beginnings of a Catalogue of Process Values
If I am right about process values, then it follows that it would
be valuable to have a catalogue of these values for use in evaluating
legal processes. My own efforts to apply the procedure for identify-
ing process values outlined in the preceding section have borne
some fruit (although of varying degrees of ripeness). Accordingly,
I now offer sketches of several possible catalogue entries to indicate
how the beginnings of the catalogue might look. The names I have
given to some of the values listed are inevitably somewhat arbi-
trary, but I hope they are not misleading. They are names for
values, not names for general process features that implement or
serve these values. However, I will include within each entry
illustrative examples of process features that do implement or
serve the relevant process value. It should be clear that some very
familiar values can readily qualify for entry as process values.
Participation and fairness are examples. But for some values, it is
not easy to articulate "value content." On this score, some of what I
say will seem sketchy and question-begging-at least initially. But I
hope that on reflection, it will seem intuitively plausible if still not
wholly convincing. 45 It should be kept in mind that the "catalogue
entries" listed below are but beginnings. I do not claim that the
values listed are universally valid, although I do want to leave open
the possibility that some may be. I concede that some are widely
espoused only in Western democracies. And even in those societies,
it would not be sound to design every legal process to implement or
serve every one of the values listed. Nor are these values "abso-
lutes." In some cases they may be justifiably overridden.
1. Participatory Governance. One of the most common fea-
tures of legal processes in democracies is that they assign various
participatory roles to citizens, and to citizens elected by citizens (or
appointed by those elected). Voting is such a role, and so is
electoral office holding. But citizens also have roles in non-electoral
processes too. In legislatures they may testify, lobby, advise, etc.
And in law-applying processes, they are often the "prime movers."
Usually, participatory roles are assigned at least to secure good
result efficacy. If people elect the legislators, they are more likely to
The number of possible strategies here is limited. But I can identify at least the
following: (1) using suggestive examples of values, (2) contrasting values with their "oppo-
sites," (3) analogizing to other closely related and indisputable values, (4) imagining unfavor-
able responses to hypothetical situations in which the values are not present, and (5) pointing
out conflicts in wbich we would still prize the value even if this meant giving up something
else.
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make laws for the good of all; if litigants present evidence and
argument in a law-applying process, it is more likely that the truth
will "out" and the right law be applied, thereby yielding good
results (assuming the law itself is good), and so on.
But whether or not participatory governance helps secure
good results, it is also good for another reason and thus qualifies as
a process value: it is an approximation to autonomous self-
determination of varying degrees of directness. It is likely that
most citizens in democracies would prefer to manage themselves
and do somewhat less well, in terms of results, than have otbers
manage them and do somewhat better. Among the "opposites" of
participatory governance are slavery, political subjugation, and
martial law. In Western history, at least, there is evidence that
slaves and the politically or militarily oppressed have objected not
only to the results of such a rule (when bad) but to its nature as
well, even when results were good. They have wanted a voice in
governing themselves, too. It is not merely that they wanted
freedom; they wanted a measure of self-determination. In varying
degrees, the participatory roles provided for in legal processes
have afforded this.46
2. Process Legitimacy. A process may (1) lack legal legiti-
macy because it is legally unauthorized, or (2) lack political legiti-
macy because it does not have the assent or acquiescence of citizens
in a democracy, or (3) lack moral legitimacy, that is, not be worthy
of moral respect because its decisions are morally bad. A process
can have features designed to secure all three forms of legitimacy:
rules of jurisdiction can help ensure that a process is legally
authorized; rules requiring public accountability can help secure
assent and acquiescence; rules providing for vetoes, for
bicameralism, and for review by another body, can, in very general
but often effective ways, help secure morally acceptable decisions.
But for now, I will not contend that the first or the third forms of
legitimacy qualify as process values.
The second form of legitimacy, public assent to, or acquies-
cence in, a mode of governance in democracies, also helps secure
good results. It at least signals that the immediate outcomes of the
process are more likely to be acceptable to the public at large, and
46 Cf COHEN, DEMOCRACY 268-74 (1971) (discussing "intrinsic values" of democracy).
Professor David Lyons has suggested to me that participation in official processes may be
good as such, apart from whatever goodness it may have as an approximation to self-rule.
However plausible this may be, I do not explore it further here, for my analysis does not
require it.
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this, in turn, signals that these outcomes are more likely to achieve
their purposes. But in my view, this form of legitimacy is also
prizable, at least in a democracy, whether or not its implementation
improves results. People prefer being ruled through a process they
assent to, or acquiesce in, rather than by one imposed on them.
The first kind regards them as human beings, the second as objects
or common pawns. Like participatory governance, assent or ac-
quiescence is a democratic value. It is not itself a form of actual
participatory governance, but rather a kind of "condition" upon
which a share of the ruling task is turned over to others.
That legitimacy as such is conceptually distinct from par-
ticipatory governance can be readily seen by reflecting on the
nature of legitimacy in many non-democratic societies. There,
legitimacy derives not from anything that smacks of participatory
governance, but rather from such sources as divine right, blood
succession, superior force, or the like. In non-democratic societies
there would be little temptation to confuse legitimacy with par-
ticipatory governance. 47 Similarly, legitimacy in those societies can-
not have the same value significance as democratic legitimacy.
3. Process Peacefulness. Most people in Western societies
take this process value for: granted. The general criminal law and
special "rules of order" applicable to specific legal processes help
secure this value. For example, duelling is forbidden as a process
for settling disputes. Vigilantism and lynching are outlawed as
processes for enforcing criminal law. Revolution is proscribed as a
process for deciding whether there is to be private property. War
as a process for conducting foreign policy is usually considered a
drastic alternative and special procedures may be required before
war can be officially declared.
Generally, well-ordered societies have elections, legislatures,
courts, and the like. One rationale for this is that results are likely
to be better. Justice is not identical with the interests of the
stronger, the more violent, or the "peaceless." But even if unpeace-
ful methods should regularly secure good results, we ought to
object to those methods. Indeed, a peaceful process is generally
preferable even when its results are somewhat less good than those
realizable through less peaceful methods. This is true not only
because in violent or disorderly processes people frequently suffer
physical harm; people understandably dislike strife and tension
47 See generally, Sternberger, Legitimacy, in 9 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOC. SCIENCES
244 (D. Sills ed. 1968). For an interesting analysis in relation to the United States, see Hurst,
Problems of Legitimacy in the Contemporary Legal Order, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 224 (1971).
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even when no one is physically harmed and the risk of harm is not
high. Other things being more or less equal, peace and repose are
simply preferable to strife and tension. Of course, as with all
process values, people may choose to sacrifice peace and repose for
some desired result even in well-ordered societies. The point is that
this would be a sacrifice, not that it would always be unjustified.
4. Humaneness and Respect for Individual Dignity. The
constitutive and regulative rules of a legal process may safeguard
persons against inhumane actions. For example, rules for inves-
tigating crime may prohibit torture. Such rules might be defended
solely on the ground that "tortured evidence" is not reliable. 48 In
other words, torture is bad because it impairs the good result
efficacy of a process. But again, there is more to it. The use of
torture in a fact-finding process is bad in itself. It is inhumane,
brutal, and barbarous, although it may in particular cases actually
yield reliable evidence. Even when it would yield reliable evidence,
however, we ought not to approve torturing procedures, unless the
circumstances are most extraordinary.
Even though a process is not inhumane, it may fail to respect
individual dignity. The use of a stomach pump (even if painless) to
extract evidence of drug use against the will of a suspect is an
example. The practice degrades, and except in the most extraordi-
nary circumstances, is unjustified. But again, this is not because the
evidentiary fruits of the practice are necessarily unreliable, but
because respect for human dignity qualifies as a process value,
The dictates of respect for individual dignity are not ex-
hausted in proscriptions against undignified fact-finding processes.
Lynching, vigilantism and other similar processes also offend
human dignity. Moreover, denial of fair access to legal processes
on grounds of race, color, or creed offend human dignity. Official
discrimination of this kind invidiously brands or degrades indi-
viduals. The victims are not treated as equally worthy of respect
before the law. They are treated as inferior beings or at best
second class citizens deprived of important grounds for self re-
spect.
Denial of participatory governance, as in the cases of slavery
and political subjugation, is also degrading. The dictates of respect
for individual dignity range far and wide.49
48 Bentham would not .have defended them in this way. See Twining & Twining,
Bentham on Torture, 24 N. IR. L.Q. 305 (1973).
49 See generally Pritchard, Human Dignity and Justice, 82 ETHiCS 299 (1972); Spiegelberg,
Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy, 9 PHILOSOPHY FORUM 39-64 (1971).
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5. Personal Privacy. The investigative function of law-
making processes and the fact-finding function of law-applying
processes may infringe upon personal privacy. Officials may force
individuals to reveal their personal beliefs or personal history.
Officials may invade homes and places of work. Various features of
our own legal processes serve as safeguards against such infringe-
ments. Again, features of this nature are not to be rationalized
solely on the basis that they help secure good process results. On
the contrary, these features can be obstacles to truthful
fact-finding. Yet in those very instances we should value these
safeguards as protecting personal privacy, for privacy is valuable in
itself whether or not its protection yields good process results.
Safeguards of privacy bar unjustified intrusions and thus imple-
ment a right to be "let alone." Of course, this right serves many
other ends, too.50
6. Consensualism. Features of legal processes, at least in
many Western democracies, permit prospective participants to
decline to participate. Thus, it is generally not a crime to refrain
from voting in an election. And administrative law-making via
regulations and rulings generally does not require affected parties
to participate. Even a criminal suspect can refuse to participate in
his trial, and a civil litigant can decline to respond to a claim.
Moreover, the laws generally do not require that citizens exercise
their legal rights to invoke a legal process. These and other
examples illustrate a bias against coercion and in favor of volun-
tarist values. 51 It is difficult to explain this state of affairs solely on
the basis that process results might be better this way. On the
contrary, compelled voting, for example, might yield better results,
usually in the form of better officials. Coerced public participation
in administrative lawmaking might yield better rulings and regula-
tions, and so on. I contend that consensualism is a process value-a
value we should espouse apart from any good result efficacy it may
have. In the absence of special circumstances, and other things
being equal, consensual participation is preferable to coerced par-
ticipation simply because choice is left to the individual. 52
7. Procedural Fairness. The features of legal processes that
secure fairness differ from process to process. Often what is fair
The growing literature in moral philosophy on "'respect for persons" is relevant here, too.
See, e.g., R. DOWNIE & E. TELFER, RESPECT FOR PERSONS (1969).
5o Cf. C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 125-32, 137-55 (1970).
51 For a very brief account that accords with the spirit of the text, see Wolff, Is Coercion
Ethically Neutral?, in NOMOS XIV-COERCION 144-48 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1972).
52 Of course, this is not to say that a legal system can dispense with coercion entirely.
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can be understood only in contrast to what is unfair.53 Consider
briefly two examples: unfair allocation of procedural advantages
within a process and unfair access to a process. In an adjudicative
process, the adjudicator might grant advantages to one side and
thereby deny the other a "fair shake." For example, an adjudicator
might choose to hear only one side of the case, or to hear one side
via both oral and written briefs, but the other via only written
briefs. This would be unfair. But would it be unfair only because it
is likely to bias the results in favor of the advantaged party? I think
not. Whether the advantaged party wins or loses, the procedure
itself is unfair, for the adjudicator does not accord equal pro-
cedural rights to parties similarly situated in relevant respects.
Many legal systems have process features designed to secure
fair process access. For example, a rule may provide that indigent
suspects shall be given free counsel in criminal proceedings. Or a
statute may limit campaign expenditures in electoral processes and
thus make offices more accessible to the poor. Or a constitutional
provision may specify that access to a process must not depend on
race, color, or creed. In some processes, fair equality of access may
only irregularly improve process results. In others, it may regularly
improve them-as in criminal cases where indigents are given free
counsel (rather than no counsel at all).
However, regardless of whether fair equality of access im-
proves process results, the features that secure this equality are
valuable. To deny access for irrelevant "reasons" of wealth, race,
color, or creed is arbitrary and therefore unfair. Except in very
special circumstances, "reasons" of this nature cannot justify dif-
ferences in access. 54
8. The Procedural Rule of Law: "Procedural Legality." A
legal process may lack procedural legality in either of two basic
ways: (1) it may simply lack rules and thus leave officials with too
much discretion, or (2) it may fail to provide mechanisms for
keeping officials within the rules. Procedural legality is valuable
whether or not it improves process results. It provides for pro-
cedural governance "by law instead of men." Other things being
equal, rule by law is generally preferable to rule by officials acting
in a legal vacuum, even in procedural matters. We may imagine
two processes that yield similar results with only one being law-
s' This is true of many expressions. Cf Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law
and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968).
U Those denied fair equality of access are also denied the opportunity for participatory
governance. Equality of access is also a dictate of procedural fairness.
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governed. We should generally prefer the law-governed one, for
its operations would be more certain and predictable. Of course,
these qualities can serve good results, too, for they enable process
participants to make intelligent procedural choices that may lead to
good results. But certainty and predictability are valuable in their
own right, as well, for they simply enable people to know where
they stand before official authority.55
9. Procedural Rationality. As Aristotle and others have ob-
served, man is a rational animal.56 Accordingly, humans generally
prefer to order their affairs through reason rather than through
random or arbitrary action, or through naked force. This value I
call procedural rationality. For many legal processes, its dictates
(expressed as maxims) include the following: (1) "carefully ascer-
tain relevant evidence and carefully canvas relevant argument," (2)
"carefully weigh that evidence and argument," (3) "deliberate
calmly and carefully," (4) "resolve issues impartially and therefore
solely on the basis. of their merits," (5) "be prepared to give reasons
for what is decided." Legal rules that constitute and regulate legal
processes typically incorporate these dictates. 57
Obviously, these dictates may serve good result efficacy. For
example, their pursuit in electoral processes is more likely to yield
better officials. And their pursuit in law-applying processes is a
necessity if law is to be "applied." Further, in lawmaking the results
are more likely to be better if the process is rational. But pro-
cedural rationality is valuable as such, apart from any good result
efficacy it has. Absent extraordinary circumstances, it is preferable
to random or arbitrary or exclusively coercive methods. Thus, of
two legal processes yielding more or less the same results, only one
of which is a rational process, we should generally prefer the
rational one. This is because it involves scrutinizable effort to use
human reason and is therefore intelligible to us in a way that the
other kinds of processes are not. Those who participate in, or are
affected by, rational processes generally have a better chance of
55 Cf. Beinart, The Rule of'Law, 1962 ACTA JURIDICA 99; Burin, The Theory of the Rule of
Law and the Structure of the Constitutional State, 15 AM. U.L. R~v. 313 (1966). The procedural
rule of law can serve other process values, too, including rationality.
" Woman, too. See ARISTOTLE, ETHICS 38 (Penguin Classics ed. 1953).
51 Professor Fuller has emphasized that various features of legal processes secure
.guarantees of deliberateness" which express "more profoundly than does the principle of
majority rule itself the role Western culture has historically assigned to reason." Fuller,
Jurisprudence, in XIII ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 152 (1965). On impartiality see especially
Eckoff, Impartiality, Separation of Powers, and Judicial Independence, 9 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN
LAW 9 (1965).
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knowing "what is going on"-of knowing what is happening to
them and why. This knowledge, in itself; is worth having.
10. Timeliness and Finality. When it is said that a process
operates with dispatch, or that it is dilatory, it is the "timeliness" of
the process that is being evaluated. 58 In our own system, for
instance, electoral processes typically operate in a timely fashion,
but our legislative and law-applying processes often do not, and are
often condemned for this. Their failure to operate in a timely
fashion can significantly affect results. For example, when a legisla-
ture delays, the problems may worsen to such an extent that it can
no longer deal with them. If a judicial proceeding is delayed,
witnesses may die, move out of the area, or become forgetful, thus
making a fact determination difficult. "
Regardless of whether or not processes improve results by
disposing of issues in a timely fashion, timeliness is itself valuable
and thus qualifies as a process value. Timeliness is, on the one
hand, the "opposite" of dilatoriness, and on the other hand the
"opposite" of haste. Dilatoriness is objectionable even if it does not
affect results. Persons to be affected by a process ought not be kept
"up in the air" for no reason. And haste is objectionable if only
because it disserves procedural rationality.
Lack of process finality and dilatoriness are related. That is,
lack of a final result may unduly draw out the proceedings. In
adjudicative processes where finality is of prime importance it
secures repose and freedom from harassment. A dispute-settling
process that is always subject to "reruns" of the same issues is
deficient as a process. 59
The preceding ten items are but sketches for entries in a
projected catalogue of process values. Doubtless these entries can
be expanded and otherwise improved upon. Indeed, whole books
have been written on some of the listed values. Still other entries
are needed if the catalogue is to be at all complete.6 °
C. "Process Value Efficacy"-Notes for a Special Catalogue Entry
The catalogue of values for evaluating processes should in-
clude a special entry on process value efficacy just as it should
58 For an insightful discussion of the value of time that has bearing in legal contexts, see
Brown, The Value of Time, 80 ETmics 173 (1970).
59 Of course, this deficiency may impair the quality of ultimate process results and be
objectionable on that ground too.
60 Among the many other possible candidates for process value status are: truth telling,
tolerance for dissent, official integrity, and public openness.
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include a special entry on good result efficacy. 61 It is important to
distinguish between particular process value efficacy and what I
will can general process value efficacy. A process may or may not
regularly or generally implement or serve a process value. General
"reliability" in implementing or serving a process value is prefera-
ble. Consider, for example, the process value of participatory
governance in criminal processes. A criminal process that merely
permits an indigent-accused to participate without also providing
him with a lawyer cannot reliably serve participatory governance.
The participatory role of an indigent in his defense cannot be as
meaningful as if he were represented by a lawyer (in what is, after
all, a technical process). Accordingly, to secure general efficacy in
implementing the relevant participatory value, the government
must provide free counsel to indigents.
The general efficacy of a process in implementing a process
value depends on two factors: (1) the efficacy of the legal rules that
prescribe the features of the process which implement or serve the
process value (e.g., rules providing for assigned counsel in the
above example), and (2) the efficacy of "implementive
mechanisms"-any corrective procedures, sanctions, or the like-to
be utilized or imposed if the foregoing rules are not followed in the
particular case (e.g., if assigned counsel is not provided).
The first of these factors embodies a means-end
hypothesis-e.g., that meaningful participation (the "end") by an
indigent accused requires competent counsel (the "means"). The
means-end hypothesis may not be soundly conceived. If unsound,
implementive effort will fail for that reason. But even if sound, it
may fail for want of corrective or sanctioning mechanisms to be
resorted to, if the legal rules embodying the hypothesis are not
followed.
"General process value efficacy" should be distinguished from
"general good result efficacy" discussed previously. 62 Recall that
the goodness of general good result efficacy ultimately depends on
the goodness of the results as judged by appropriate standards.
But the goodness of general process value efficacy does not depend
on the goodness of results. Instead, it depends merely on the
relevant process value being truly a process value.
Of course, the efficacy of a process to implement or serve a
process value may conflict with the efficacy of that process to yield
a good result. For example, police investigations may pose this
6 See part III supra.
62 See id.
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conflict. To solve a crime (good result efficacy) it may be necessary
to detain and interrogate a person against his will in circumstances
in which the suspect is put in fear and feels helpless, thereby
infringing the process value of respect for individual dignity. Or,
an administrative-regulatory process, for example, may pose a
"process vs. result" conflict. Thus, to reduce drunken driving (good
result efficacy), drivers may be required to submit to blood tests
against their will, thereby infringing respect for individual dignity
and personal privacy (both process values). Numerous other ex-
amples could be cited.
D. An Addendum on the Relations Between Process Values and
the Values for Evaluating Process Results
Of the various kinds of process results, what I have called
"immediate outcomes" are most commonly evaluated. These out-
comes include laws, applications of law, court orders, and the like.
Among the familiar values often used to evaluate such outcomes,
the following may be listed:
1. Liberty. This value includes both "daily life" liberties such as
freedom of worship and movement, and political liberties such as
freedom of expression.
2. Substantive justice. This value encompasses the justice of
deserved reparations and compensation, the justice of punish-
ments, the justice of inter-personal transactions, and the justice of
state distributions of benefits and burdens.
3. Income and wealth.
4. Formal and substantial equality of opportunity. Included
here are equality of access to education and the absence of restric-
tions on access to significant social roles.
5. Security of person and property.
6. Community peace.
7. Human dignity.
Although the foregoing list overlaps the list of process values
discussed previously, 63 I believe that some values are generally
appropriate only to evaluating processes as processes while others
are appropriate only to evaluating process results. I will not,
however, try to establish this, for my principal thesis does not
depend on it. My principal thesis is that there are values which,
when implemented in an appropriate process, are prizable whether
or not their implementation improves process results. To sustain
this thesis, it is not necessary to show that values for judging
63 See text accompanying notes 45-60 supra.
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processes and values for judging results are different. These values
could all be the same and the thesis still hold. Consider this
example: Assume that a lawmaking process is peaceful. Assume
also that it yields laws that help secure community peace. This
"process and result aggregate" is valuable on two counts, not one:
the process itself is peaceful, and its results contribute to commu-
nity peace. Now, assume that although the lawmaking process is
itself peaceful, it fails to yield laws that help secure community
peace. The process is still good as a process in that it is peaceful.
Process peacefulness, then, qualifies as a process value, for it is
prized whether or not its implementation also improves results. Yet
the standards of value for judging both process and result in this
example are the same.
In any event, this much is undeniably true: In a particular case,
the values appropriate to evaluating a given process will not neces-
sarily be the same as the values for evaluating its results. Indeed, the
values will often be different. For example, a lawmaking process
may be judged good as a process because it provides for participa-
tory governance, is peaceful, and operates in a fashion that is
procedurally rational and fair. But its results-statutes-might be
judged good because, for example, they contribute to the general
safety by requiring that cars not be capable of going faster than
fifty miles an hour. How the values relevant to judging processes
and to judging results may vary can be indicated schematically as
follows:
1. A process might be judged good because it has VI, V2,
and V3, but its outcomes good because they have V4 and
V5.
2. A process might be judged good because it has VI, V2,
and V3, but some of its outcomes bad because they lack V4
and V5.
3. A process might be judged bad because it lacks VI, V2,
and V3, -yet some of its outcomes good because they have
V4 and V5.
4. A process might be judged bad because it lacks VI, V2,
and V3, and its outcomes bad because they lack V4 and
V5.
5. A process might be judged bad because it lacks VI and V2,
and it might be unclear whether its outcomes are good or
bad. (A common kind of case.)
6. A process might be judged good because it has VI and V2,
and it might be unclear whether its outcomes are good or
bad. (A common kind of case.)
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Many other permutations are, of course, possible.
In summary, then, at least some values generally appropriate to
judging results are also generally appropriate to judging processes.
But in particular cases, the values appropriate to judging the one
and the other will not necessarily be the same, and, in fact, will
often be very different. Process values, then, at least have this kind
of independent significance.
E. Process Values Reconsidered-Five Skeptical Attacks
A skeptic may quarrel with various aspects of my process
values thesis, or even deny the reality of process values altogether.
Therefore, I shall address various skeptical attacks.6 4 My responses
are not absolutely decisive, but they are all I can now offer.
1. "Ideal Results" Skepticism
I have contended that features of processes that implement or
serve process values are good regardless of any good results to
which these features may contribute. Imagine an "ideal results"
skeptic who counters as follows:
Suppose an ideal world ruled by a philosopher queen (P.Q.)
who by her own direct action always makes ideal laws, always
applies them correctly, and always achieves the correct result. In
such a society there would be no legal processes. Consequently,
there could be no process values. And if we lived in this society,
we would not object to P.Q.'s governance, for the results would
be ideal. This shows that process features are valuable only
because in our own world legal processes are necessary to pro-
vide good results with regularity. Accordingly, there are no
"process values."
In response to the "ideal results" skeptic, I offer three points.
First, I deny that even in such an ideal world, people would not
object to P.Q.'s rule. I believe that if those people were like us, they
would prefer at least some measure of participatory governance.
Second, P.Q.'s world is simply not our world. We need legal
processes to maximize good results.
Third, in any event, the conclusion of the "ideal results"
skeptic does not follow from his premise. Even if in his ideal world
64 For my purposes it is fortunately not necessary to go into every source of value
skepticism here. For instance, I do not undertake to treat the sophisticated arguments of
those philosophers who stress the disanalogies between facts and values and deny that value
judgments can be rationally defended. See, e.g., A. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (2d
ed. 1946). Nor do I treat commonplace sources of value skepticism more characteristic of the
laity-e.g., the view that any phenomenon (whether a value or not) which is abstract, general,
nebulous, and somewhat imprecisely articulable is more or less unreal.
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legal processes are not needed, and therefore citizens have no
occasion to espouse process values, it would not follow that in a
society where legal processes are needed, their features are prized
only for their good result efficacy. Why should not these processes
be good as processes, too? Although process values are "parasitic"
on processes, it does not follow that process features that serve
those values are valuable only because they further good results
desired by those who set up the process.
2. "Future Results" Skepticism
In arguing for process values, I have sometimes cited exam-
ples in which a process is bad because it ignores or infringes a
process yalue, but, its result in the particular instance nonetheless
is good.6 5 I have then concluded that the badness of the process
cannot derive from badness of result, because the results are good.
Imagine a "future results" skeptic who responds as follows:
Where the process is bad but the results good, the badness
of the process is still result-dependent, for while badness of
process has no adverse effect on results in the case or cases at
hand, its regular reoccurrence would necessarily affect results
adversely. Hence, any criticism of process badness is really
result-oriented, even if those results are hypothetical future ones.
I offer these responses: First, any force the skeptic's argument
may have diminishes insofar as the causal relation between badness
of process and badness of result is tenuous. The causal relation
between some process features that in my view implement or serve
process values, and the corresponding process results, is tenuous
indeed. Participatory governance, for example, finds expression as
a process value in majority vote of an elective legislative body. Yet
failure to abide by majority rule, for example, is far from any
guarantee that the result will be bad in future cases, let alone the
case at hand. But we nonetheless espouse majority rule as a
prizable feature of lawmaking processes. It therefore seems highly
unlikely that our espousal is solely attributable to whatever good
result efficacy majority rule may have in future cases.
Second, even if people should come to think like the "future
results" skeptic, I contend that they ought not to do so. Instead
they ought to recognize process values for what they are-values
that make process features prizable in their own right, indepen-
dent of result. These values are realizable in the course of the
workings of a process rather than merely in its end results. Why
65 See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
[Vol. 60:1
LEGAL PROCESSES
should not the inner workings of processes be recognized as a
possible "realm of value realization," too, independently of end
results? The future results skeptic seems blind to this possibility.
3. "Skeptical Behindism"
I have contended that process features can be good solely for
the sake of the process values they implement or serve. The skeptic
who insists on what I will call "behindism" might argue as follows:
It won't do just to give a name to, describe, or elaborate on
what an alleged process value is, and then assert that a process
feature is good for the sake of this process value. Moreover, to
say that an alleged process value, such as participatory gover-
nance, is good for its own sake is to stop the analysis at an
arbitrary point. If we will only go behind alleged process values,
we will always discover relevant "outcome" values. Thus, it will
always turn out that the goodness of a process, "as a process,"
depends on its contribution to the goodness of process results as
judged by "outcome" values.
First, I do not deny that many process features, in addition to
being good for the sake of the process values they implement or
serve, are also good for the sake of any good results that they
contribute to. Second, "behindism" carried to extremes would
land us in an infinite regress. There must be a stopping point
somewhere.66 The "behindism" skeptic might concede as much but
assert that this point is reached only when, in going behind a
so-called process value, we identify a higher value appropriate to
judging process results. In my view, it is dogmatic to insist on this.
Third, it is simply not arbitrary to halt the regress with a process
value. Admittedly, in my listing and analysis of process values I
sometimes rested merely with suggestive or intuitively plausible
sketches of how it is that they render process features valuable. But
some process values are so taken for granted in our own society
-even though they are not necessarily implemented-that it ought
to be sufficient merely to call attention to them. I invite the skeptic
to review in this light such examples as participatory governance,
humaneness, process peacefulness, procedural fairness, and legiti-
macy. Fourth, I readily admit to less than perfect understanding of
some process values. Their value significance is difficult to articu-
late. I believe, however, that I have done more than merely give
names to possible values. In regard to each value I have said at
66 Or so many believe. This issue is discussed in C. WELLMAN, CHALLENGE AND
RESPONSE-JUSTIFICATION IN ETHICS ch. 6 (1971) ("Infinite Regresses").
1974]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
least enough to rebut any charge that I am merely labeling
phenomena as valuable. It therefore seems fair to shift the burden
of proof to the "behindism" skeptic.
4. "Ultimate Values" Skepticism
It might be possible to formulate a satisfactory theory about
the "ultimate value grounding" of process values. For instance, one
might try to "ground" these values in generalities about human
nature, or in some all-encompassing theory of rationality, or in an
ideal conception of society. Since I have not attempted this, a
skeptic might contend:
In order for the process values thesis to be convincing,
proponents of the thesis must show in ultimate terms why
claimed process values are valuable, and this would require that
they be grounded in some comprehensive and justified axiologi-
cal theory.
I concede that, if I could show some such "ultimate value
grounding" for each process value, this might strengthen the
justificatory force of my thesis. But the very possibility of executing
such a project is itself the subject of philosophical debate.67 And
the project is beyond the purposes and scope of this Essay. To
sustain my principal thesis, it is only necessary to cite some process
values which, as values, are familiar and uncontroversial, and which
render process features prizable regardless of results. I believe that
most of my catalogue entries fall in this category.
5. "Experiential Effects" Skepticism
I have claimed that process features that implement or serve
process values are valuable for the sake of those process values.
Imagine an "experiential effects" skeptic who argues as follows:
Process features that implement or serve process values are
not valuable for the sake of those process values. They are
valuable only if those involved in or affected by the process
actually experience certain psychological reactions or sensations.
These experiences are one type of process result. Hence process
values are result-dependent values.
Before responding to this argument, I will state it more fully.
Consider the following two tables:
17 See generally P. TAYLOR, NORMATIVE DISCOURSE 68-188 (1961); Feigl, Validation and
Vindication-An Analysis of the Nature and Limits of Ethical Arguments, in READINGS I N ETHICAL
THEORY 667 (W. Sellars & J. Hospers eds. 1952).
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TABLE A
Process Feature Implementing a Process Experiential Effects
Value
I. Accused's unimpaired participation in Feeling of accused that he has had
his own defense (Process value: Partic- his full "day in court"
ipatory Governance)
2. Accused's freedom from torture to get Avoidance of fear and physical harm to
a confession (Process value: Humane- accused
ness)
3. Plaintiffs equal opportunity to present Feeling of plaintiff that he has been
his side of his case (Process value: Pro- treated fairly
cedural Fairness)
4. Administrator's statement of findings of Feeling of applicant that he has been
fact and reasons for denying an appi- treated in a rational, non-arbitrary way
cation for welfare benefits (Process
value: Procedural Rationality)
TABLE B
Process Feature Infringing a Process Value Experiential Effects
I. Denial to accused of any participation Accused's anger, bitterness
in his defense
2. Torture of accused Fear, physical harm, anger, bitterness
3. Denial to plaintiff of right to present Plaintiffs anger, bitterness
his case to civil court
4. Arbitrary denial of application without Anger and bitter feelings of applicant
reviewing facts
The "experiential effects" skeptic argues that values such as
participatory governance, humaneness, procedural fairness, and
procedural rationality are valuable only for the experiential effects
that accompany their implementation through features of pro-
cesses. Thus, they derive their value from other "things" (right
column, Table A), and also their disvalue (right column, Table B),
and these other things are classifiable in my own scheme as process
results-side effects or consequences collateral to immediate
outcomes. 68 Accordingly, the skeptic concludes that the very con-
cept of process values is logically incoherent. There simply cannot
be any values which make process features valuable without regard
to whether these features contribute to good process results. The
experiential effects required for process values to render process
features valuable are themselves one variety of process "result," as
that term is used in this Essay.
In my view, however, the process value served by a process
feature is not dependent for its value on occurrences of feelings and
other experiences, at least not in particular cases. Suppose, for
68 See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
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example, that a litigant is actually given a full and fair opportunity
in court. That very litigant may still go away dissatisfied and
embittered. The experiential effects skeptic would say that the
process therefore did not accord the litigant either an opportunity
for participatory governance, or procedural fairness. But if this is
so, we will be plunged into subjectivism. The same feature of a
process would or would not be regarded as having process value,
depending on the subjective experiences of those involved or
affected. Yet various factors may explain why the persons involved
or affected may not be satisfied when, on objective analysis, the
process features do serve relevant process values. These persons
might have been mistaken about facts. They might have misunder-
stood an official. They might have been unreasonable. Their ex-
pectations might have been unrealistic in the first place. Or they
may be so dissatisfied with the immediate outcome that they are
unable to perceive anything good in the process. Similarly, process
disvalue is not dependent on the occurrence of feelings of anger or
bitterness.69
An "experiential effects" skeptic might espouse a less radical
view, namely, that although process features that serve process
values are not dependent for their value on the occurrence of
"value experiences" in particular cases, they do generally depend for
their value on the more or less regular occurrence of such experi-
ences. It is not possible for me to respond satisfactorily to this view
here. But even if the view is correct, at the very least it would
remain open to me to revise my theory as follows: A process value
is a value which makes features of a process good, whether or not
those features also contribute to good outcomes (as opposed to such
outcomes plus side effects and collateral consequences). Thus,
process values would still constitute standards for evaluating a
process as a process. And these standards would be distinct from
"good outcome efficacy." They would not necessarily be the same
as the standards appropriate to judging process outcomes, as
outcomes, in particular cases. Thus, my principal thesis would re-
main largely intact.
F. A Summary Diagram
It may now be useful to summarize the specific ways in which
an illustrative process feature might contribute to the total good-
ness of a process as a process. In the diagram below, I have used the
process feature of "party participation" in an adjudicative process
as an illustration.
69 Cf Baylis, GRADING, VALUES, AND CHOICE, LXVII MIND 485, 495-96 (1958).
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V
THE NONUSE AND MISUSE OF PROCESS VALUES IN ACTUAL
PRACTICE-AN INVENTORY
Process values are relevant in evaluating and in choosing
between legal processes, actual or proposed. I will identify several
different ways in which these values may be ignored or misused.
My examples will be drawn from our own society. In this way, the
reader may judge whether a "plea for process values" is appro-
priate.
A. Evaluations and Choices That Ignore Process Values-
"Result Orientation" Par Excellence
A review of the scholarly literature will dismay believers in
process values. Many "policy scientists," moral philosophers, and
students of decisional strategies in government ignore process
values.70 Thus, when economists and others theorize about gov-
ernment benefits and "public goods," only rarely do they count
process values as benefits or goods. 1 Some political scientists,
especially behaviorists, seem to ignore evaluative questions
altogether.7 2 "Systems analysts" commonly leave process values out
of account.73 Many moral philosophers-particularly those of
utilitarian persuasion-stress quality of result (consequences)7 4 and
ignore process values. Even law professors regularly neglect pro-
cess values,7 5 although they insist on "due process" as a means to
good outcomes.
Do the myopias of social theorists ever afflict social actors? It
would be strange if they did not. Presidents in our time have
ignored the most elemental process values. So, too, legislators.
Indeed, even judges as sophisticated as Holmes,7 6 and more re-
70 Proving "negatives" is almost always impossible, strictly speaking. Here I will rest with
references to what I take to be representative figures.
71 Even the most important thinkers say little or nothing of process values. See, e.g.,
Arrow, supra note 14; Stigler, supra note 14.
7'2 This is an oft-noted and oft-discussed fact. See, e.g., Berns, Law and Behavioral Science,
28 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 185, 203 (1964). But there are signs of change.
73 See, e.g., SYSTEMS THINKING (F. Emery ed. 1969).
74 See generally, J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST (1973);
Brock, Recent Work in Utilitarianism, 10 AM. PHIL. Q. 241, 249-65 (1973).
15 But there are rare exceptions. Two notable ones are Professors Laurence Tribe and
Charles Fried of Harvard. See C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 105-15 (1970); Tribe, Policy
Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 66 (1972).
11 For example, see Holmes's opinion in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917), in
which he justified giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard solely as a means of doing
"substantial justice" in terms of outcome.
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cently, Fortas,77 sometimes have failed to perceive process values
under their very noses. Then, too, lay ignorance of process values
is widespread. Consider how often laymen seem ready to dismiss
procedural rules as "mere technicalities" even though these are the
very rules which must secure most process values.
B. Evaluations and Choices in Which Process Values Are
Only Dimly Appreciated
It is one thing to ignore process values altogether. It is another
to fail to grasp the significance of relevant process values. Doubt-
less one reason some process values are ignored is because they are
inherently elusive and vagne. They would be less often ignored if
they were more easily perceived. The value significance, for in-
stance, of legitimacy, procedural legality, and procedural rational-
ity lack instant intelligibility. Moreover, even when such values are
readily understood, their practical dictates in the context at hand
may not be perceived. Of course, not all process values are elusive
to the understanding. For example, participatory governance and
procedural fairness can be grasped more or less readily.
Evaluations and choices, then, may sometimes be made with
only a dim appreciation of relevant process values. And although this
will not necessarily lead, in particular cases, to determinations that
undesirably sacrifice process values, it presumably inclines decision
makers to accord less weight to process values than they otherwise
would.
C. Evaluations and Choices that Unjustifiably Sacrifice Process
Values: A Further Form of "Result Orientation"
Values inevitably conflict. And in order to achieve desired
results, it will sometimes even be necessary to sacrifice process
values. But particular sacrifices may be quite unjustified. For ex-
ample, some "men of action" might prefer the election of one
presidential candidate over another. Consequently, they might
clandestinely sabotage electoral processes in order to secure the
outcome they desire. In so doing, they would be sacrificing at least
the process values of participatory governance, of legitimacy, and
of fairness of process. Many observers believe this is exactly what
occurred during the Nixon reelection campaign for the Presidency
in 1972. Certainly some of Nixon's supporters interfered with
77 An example is provided by his opinion in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1967),
where, after only an oblique reference to fairness, he proceeds to justify according "due
process" to juveniles on the ground that it yields better outcomes.
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Democratic primaries and with the Democratic general election
campaign. Part of their strategy was to facilitate the nomination of
an arguably "weak" opponent. Some of former President Nixon's
supporters presumably felt that he must be reelected at any cost,7 8
process values be damned.
Similarly, when President Nixon offered a federal district
judge the directorship of the FBI during the course of a criminal
trial over which the judge was presiding, and in which the
President's own appointees were prosecuting a celebrated anti-
Nixonite (Daniel Ellsberg), the President apparently evinced a
willingness to sacrifice impartiality for the sake of influencing the
trial's outcome.7 9 Impartiality is a dictate of procedural rationality:
It helps to assure that only factors relevant to the merits influence
the outcome. President Nixon similarly sacrificed impartiality and
legitimacy when he refused to permit the first Watergate special
prosecutor to function independently, and dismissed him for refus-
ing to limit a prosecutorial investigation to which the President
himself was subject. s0
Activists of the left have also sacrificed process values in
circumstances in which the sacrifice was dubious. It is now almost
trite to cite in this context the excesses of the civil rights movement
in the late 1950's and early 1960's.81 But consider the "building
takeovers" on university campuses in the late 1960's and early
1970's, too. Frequently these were not mere "protests," but efforts
to "negotiate" campus lawmaking and other decisions, in which the
building occupants frequently refused to vacate until their de-
mands were met (or until they had sufficient assurances that their
demands would be met).s2 These activists sacrificed, for the sake of
78 See Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972 Before the Senate Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., bk. 2, at 814 (1973) (testimony of Jeb
Stuart Magruder).
79 At the President's direction, John Ehrlichman met twice with Judge Matthew Byrne,
and the Judge met once with the President. See generally id., bk. 6, at 2617-22 (testimony of
John Ehrlicbman).
so For relevant reflections of the former special prosecutor, see Cox, Ends, N.Y. Times,
May 19, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 27. Professor Cox observed that the Watergate affair
illustrates the erosion of process values in public life, though he did not use this terminology.
Id. at 66, 68, 72.
What many of those involved in Watergate did also constituted violations of personal
moral standards recognized in our society. But process values must not be confused with
such standards, although there is some overlap.
81 But for an exceptional account, see Bickel, Watergate and the Legal Order, 57
COMMENTARY 19 (1974).
82 See generally R. SuMMERs & C. HOWARD, supra note 2, at 533-95 (1972). As might be
expected, the literature on "political direct action" of this period is generally devoid of
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outcomes, such process values as legitimacy (the campus building
takeover is not a legitimate decisional process), participatory self-
rule (only the self-appointed occupants participate "for the stu-
dents"), and procedural rationality (seldom do such permit rational
deliberation, fact-finding, and the like).83
Of all branches of our positive law, it is in the criminal field
that process values and desired outcomes regularly conflict most
dramatically. Since conviction of the guilty is a desired outcome of
high priority, it should not be surprising that officials have occa-
sionally subordinated process values to this outcome. For example,
until recently police not uncommonly infringed the process values
of humaneness, of respect for individual dignity, and of personal
privacy, all in the name of convicting the guilty via warrantless
intrusions and "third degree" methods.8 4 The courts have now
interpreted the Constitution to prohibit most such infringements
and have extended the "exclusionary rule" to put teeth in these
prohibitions.8 5 But it has not always been so, and it is not always so
in practice even now. Indeed, in many places plea bargaining
accounts for a high proportion of our criminal convictions, yet it
offends many process values, including some of the very ones
protected by these recent constitutional interpretations. Thus,
when police and prosecutor induce an accused to "bargain away"
rights guaranteeing him protection from a lawless police intrusion
or coerced confession, in exchange for a guilty plea to a charge
carrying a lighter sentence, the so-called "exclusionary rule" loses a
measure of its efficacy as a means of protecting process values.
I do not contend that sacrifices of process values are never
justified. It is always possible to postulate overriding considera-
tions. In some circumstantial patterns, sacrifices of process values
may even be regularly justified. In internal security employee
concern for process values, even as authored by sophisticated college professors. See, e.g., M.
WALZER, POLITICAL AcTIoN-A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MOVEMENT POLITICS (1971).
83 Of course, this is not necessarily to say that what the campus activists did was as
objectionable as what the "Watergaters" did. Official misbehavior is especially objectionable
and dangerous. See J. LIEBERMAN, HOW THE GOVERNMENT BREAKS THE LAW (1972).
1 want to stress that in this Essay I have striven for an analysis that is politically neutral
as between liberals and conservatives. Whether I have succeeded is for the reader to judge.
But I do plead guilty to advocating a thesis that conserves process values, many of which are
liberal in character. Is a thesis which conserves liberal values conservative? If so, so be it.
84 See, e.g., Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv. 411
(1954).
85 The main developments are recounted in admirably concise fashion by two scholars
of the subject in J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 85-179,
210-56, 280-335 (1971).
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dismissals, for example, it may be justifiable to accord an employee
less than a full public hearing for the sake of safeguarding state
secrets. Here the process value of participatory governance, among
others, is sacrificed to some degree. Or, in order to remove risks
from the roadways more efficiently, allegedly drunken drivers
might be denied a right to cross-examine those who perform blood
tests. Here, too, there may be justifiable sacrifice of a participatory
value.
I believe, however, that many officials are inclined, as a matter
of course, to sacrifice process values in return for desired out-
comes, whether or not the sacrifice is justified. And I believe that
unjustified sacrifices would occur less often if more officials were
alert to process values and if a workable calculus could be devised
for weighing process values against other values. The late Learned
Hand and others have noted that such a calculus would be extra-
ordinarily difficult to devise. 86
It may be useful to try to explain why process values tend to be
sacrificed to outcomes when the two come into conflict. First, of
course, the value of the outcome served may simply outweigh, or
be thought to outweigh, process values. Second, insofar as process
values are difficult to articulate and hard to measure, decision
makers probably accord less weight to them. Third, the legal
precepts that purport to secure process values seldom wear their
rationales on their faces; 87 accordingly, the protected values are
somewhat hidden from view and have to be "unearthed" for
consideration. Fourth, there is a widespread tendency merely to
view procedures as technicalities or rules of thumb. Any values
they protect are therefore assumed to be inconsequential.
D. Evaluations and Choices Which Unjustifiably Sacrifice One
Process Value to Another
There are many examples of the phenomenon whereby
one process value is sacrificed to another. For instance,- speed of
decision (timeliness) is a process value (as contrasted with dilatori-
ness). Yet unhurried deliberation and careful fact-finding are dic-
tates of quite another process value too: procedural rationality.
Sometimes these values conflict. The majority of the Supreme
Court in the "Pentagon Papers" case hurried to an early decision
86 L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 261 (1952). See aiso B. CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF
LEGAL SCIENCE 56-57 (1928).
'7 See Part VI (C) infra.
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even though this involved, according to Justice Harlan, an
unjustified sacrifice of procedural rationality.88
Thus, officials may sacrifice a process value not merely for the
sake of an outcome they desire, but also to achieve that outcome
quickly. To cite a further clash of process values: Full participation
by both sides in an adjudicative process may conflict with the
process value of finality. This can occur when one party later learns
of new evidence and seeks to have a case reopened.
E. Evaluations and Choices Which "Overvalue" Process Values
Although in my opinion, the overwhelming tendency in our
society is to undervalue most process values, they may sometimes
be overvalued too. Participatory governance, for instance, is com-
monly overvalued. It is simply not possible in a society like ours for
persons to participate in every significant stage of every significant
decisional process that might significantly affect them. And even
where possible, it would not necessarily be appropriate, given such
other desiderata as expertise and confidentiality. Where participa-
tion is both possible and appropriate, the specific form of proposed
participation might be inappropriate. For example, it would hardly
be appropriate to decide on the tenure of a teacher solely by
majority vote of students, or on the content of a public school
curriculum solely by majority vote of parents. Yet our law carries
some participatory roles to excess. For example, in many states,
laws give teachers' unions-as distinguished from teachers-a large
say in formulating basic educational policy in our public schools. 89
And it is notorious that our laws generally permit vested economic
interests a large say in legislative processes through lobbying,
campaign contributions, and the like.
F. Evaluations and Choices Which Neglect General Process
Value Efficacy
The evaluator (or "chooser") neglects still another impor-
tant evaluative dimension when he fails to consider how a process
might be better designed in order to implement the process values it
is supposed to implement. This is not a rare occurrence. For
example, it took American courts over a hundred years to see that
our criminal processes were poorly designed to secure meaningful
66 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Harlan, j., dissenting).
Of course, this is not to say that the only values at stake were process values.
89 See e.g., N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAw §§ 200-214 (McKinney Supp. 1973) ("Taylor Act").
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participation by indigent defendants. In the end, the courts re-
quired free counsel.9°
VI
IMPLEMENTING PROCESS VALUES THROUGH LAW-
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
A people that seeks to implement values through law as process
values will (1) stand ready to criticize infringements upon or depar-
tures from these values for special reasons-reasons that are not
exclusively result oriented; and (2) see to the legal implementation
of these values, even though this does not necessarily enhance the
quality of process results. Thus, even when results are good, the
people will be concerned about departures from and infringements
upon process values.
In order to implement process values through law, a legal
system must provide:
1. Means of designing process features to "embody" process
values in the first place.
2. Corrective mechanisms, sanctioning devices, and the like
which may come into play when "built-in" process values
are infringed, regardless of outcome.
3. Means by which process administrators and persons af-
fected by processes can tell whether specific processes are
in fact intended to secure process values (or ought to be so
regarded).
4. Means by which process administrators (official and other)
can tell whether a process value that a process has been
designed to implement has been infringed in a particular
case.
I will now discuss each of these requirements. 91
A. Means of Designing Process Features to "Embody" Process
Values in the First Place
This is a relatively unproblematic requirement. Through the
use of procedural norms-rules, principles, maxims, rulings, and
90 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
91 It should be recalled that more effective implementation of process values is but one
way of improving legal processes. See generally Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civil
To Promote Justice That Is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. RFv. 797 (1971).
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the like-the features of a process can be designed to "embody" a
value. For example, rules and other norms can provide for a
hearing to implement the process value of participatory govern-
ance. As already indicated, whether one value rather than
another is secured can affect the shape of a process in terms of the
stages of the process, who is assigned what participatory roles in
the process, what steps are specified in these roles, and so on.92
In some legal systems, specific constitutional provisions require
that certain processes have specified features. 93 And in some sys-
tems there may be a generalized "due process" requirement appli-
cable to all legal processes.94 Requirements of this nature may
operate to implement process values, too.
B. Corrective Mechanisms and Sanctioning Devices
Even though the law prescribes a process feature (e.g., right to
a hearing), in order to implement a process value (e.g., participa-
tion), that feature might be unlawfully ignored or bypassed in
particular cases. Corrective mechanisms and sanctioning devices
are therefore needed as well.
Corrective mechanisms include provisions for vetoes, for re-
view by another body, for invalidation of an outcome as unau-
thorized, for optional or required "reruns" of the process (includ-
ing reruns without use of the same facts as used in the first "run"),
and so on. Sanctioning devices include ordinary penalties like those
imposed under the criminal law, administrative sanctions, private
remedies against officials, and whatever sanctions there may be in
internal codes of ethics applicable to officials.
The main types of occasions for invoking corrective
mechanisms and sanctioning devices when process values em-
bodied in a process are ignored or bypassed (contrary to law) are
three-fold:
(A) The "bad process," "bad outcome" 95 cases.
(B) The "bad process" cases in which it is unclear whether the
outcome itself is good or bad (a large class of cases), and
(C) The "bad process," "good outcome" cases.
A legal system may choose to use different mechanisms or devices
in these cases. If the case is of type (C). the system might choose
92 See Part II supra.
" See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See generally M. MOSKowiTz, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD ORDER (1958).
94 Id.
9, "Outcome" is used here to refer to "immediate outcomes" of the types listed in note
23 supra.
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not to "rerun" the process, for the outcome was good by the
relevant outcome standards of value. Instead, in cases of type (C),
the system might only provide for sanctions against anyone culpably
responsible for the "bad process." But even in some kinds of type
(C) cases, the social desirability of emphatically vindicating the
desired process value might call for a rerun 'bf the process as
prescribed in the first place. For example, we might require that a
legislative process yielding a good law (good outcome) without a
majority vote (bad process) nevertheless be repeated. Or a criminal
conviction based partly on conclusive evidence (good outcome)
secured through involuntary stomach pumping (bad process)
might be overturned with the proviso that the case be retried
without the use of any "pumped out" evidence.9 6
In cases of type (A) it will often not be possible to tell whether
the process deficiency contributed to the outcome. Yet there will be
cases where it plainly did contribute. In both of these situations, a
rerun will often be appropriate for two purposes: to secure the
desired outcome and to vindicate the relevant process value. But
what if the case is one in which the process deficiency plainly did
not contribute to the bad outcome? Here, it may be enough to
impose some sanction on the infringing party without any kind of
rerun. But again, the value involved might be of such significance
that a rerun would be called for either alone or in addition to the
sanction.
All cases of type (B) can be treated analogously to those of type
(A).
C. Means of Determining Whether a Process Value is
to be Implemented
It would do little good to design processes to implement
process values, and to provide for corrective mechanisms and
sanctioning devices, if it would be impossible for anyone reliably to
tell when a process feature had been designed to implement a
value as a process value rather than designed-merely as a means to
certain outcomes or types of outcomes.
Identification is an acute problem because most process fea-
tures capable of implementing process values are at the same time
capable of serving as means to certain outcomes. A right to partici-
pate in a hearing is an apt example. As I have noted, this right
might be built into a process merely to facilitate fact-finding re-
" Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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quired for certain outcomes and not because participatory gover-
nance is in itself considered desirable. Or this right might be built
into the process both to secure the participatory process value and to
serve the outcome value of truthful fact-finding. At least when
such a right is.intended to secure a process value, officials should
generally take appropriate corrective or sanctioning steps to im-
plement that value whenever (1) both process and outcome are
bad, and (2) process is bad but quality of outcome unclear. But how
can officials tell when a process feature is designed to implement a
process value (at least in part)? Of course, simple cases can be
imagined in which those responsible for a process are quite explicit
about why its features are as they are, and an official record of
these reasons might even be kept.
However, the designers and others responsible for legal pro-
cesses in particular societies are rarely so explicit. Consequently,
those who wish to bring corrective mechanisms and sanctioning
devices into play will often be called upon to argue for the
proposition that a given feature is intended to implement a process
value and that its infringement calls for repetition of the process or
some other form of corrective or sanctioning action.
I know of no formula for the required arguments. I offer only
an illustrative case to show the general character of such argumen-
tation. Much of this argumentation is essentially evidentiary but
some of it is more speculative and rationalistic. 97
We may imagine a society, Bodea, that has the following
somewhat extreme legal principle (A): "Whenever the adminis-
trators of a legal process infringe a prescribed process value, the
process itself shall be repeated without the infringement, even
though the outcome is good." We may imagine further that the
Bodeans have adopted another legal principle (B): "Statute laws
are to be enacted by a majority vote of the democratically consti-
tuted Bodean legislature." Assume the Bodeans do not leave any
evidence as to their reasons for adopting (B).
Assume also that forty percent of the legislature assembles and
''passes" a law against religious discrimination in employment,
formerly a problem in Bodea. All Bodeans applaud this law as a
good outcome. But some Bodeans-let us call them the PV
Bodeans-claim that the actions of the legislators violate principle
(B), and that a majority vote is a process feature designed to secure
the process value of participatory governance within the meaning of
97 Cf Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticsm
66 YALE L.J. 319, 328-34, 339 n.125 (1957).
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principle (A), and that the process must therefore be repeated to
"vindicate majority vote," and to validate the law.
Did the people of Bodea, in adopting (B), intend it, among
other things, to be a means of implementing a participatory pro-
cess value as such, or did they intend it only as a way of securing
good outcomes or as a safeguard against bad outcomes? How
might the PV Bodeans, assuming Bodea is very much like America,
argue for the former? At the outset, they would need to establish
that majority vote is indeed susceptible of being espoused for
reasons in addition to, or wholly apart from, desired outcomes.
This the PV Bodeans could readily do. For example, they could
urge persuasively that majority vote not merely guarantees better
outcomes, but also that it is possible for Bodeans to believe in
majority vote for reasons apart from outcomes, such as the desire
for participatory governance. Once having shown that a given
process feature is susceptible of having process value (and not
merely instrumental value as a means to outcomes), the PV Bo-
deans would then have to argue that the relevant Bodeans did in
fact incorporate majority vote in their legislative process at least
partly because of its approximation to self-governance. Assuming
that there is no indisputable or substantially convincing direct
evidence of this espousal, we might expect the PV Bodeans to try
to make arguments of the following types.
First, it would be helpful for the PV Bodeans to try to establish
a presumption that any process features susceptible of having
process value shall, in the absence of contrary evidence, be viewed
as intended to secure the relevant process value. This would be a
presumption as to the likely intent of those responsible for the
process (assuming, as we are, that there is no convincing direct
evidence of this intent). The strength of any such presumption
would vary from society to society. For example, such a presump-
tion would be exceedingly weak in any society in which process
designers rarely sought to implement process values through law.
But the contrary would be true in societies in which process
designers frequently designed process features not merely as
means to certain process outcomes, but- also as means to secure
process values.
The presumption would be strengthened all the more if it
could be shown that the society is one generally infused with regard
for process values. Indications of this might take a variety of forms.
For example, explicit signs might be found throughout the general
law and relevant forms of legislative and other lawmaking history
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of the society. But one should also look at the standards of criticism
that social critics invoke to judge the behavior of process designers.
Such standards would be found in the various media, journals,
books, and so forth. Further, one should look to oft-repeated
slogans from everyday life, provided they reflect more than lip
service. Two examples readily come to mind: "The end does not
justify the means" and "It is not whether you win or lose, but how
you play the game that counts."
Second, it may be possible to show that the value in question is
one that the society generally espouses in a variety of other con-
texts, apart from the one at hand,for reasons that are relevant to its
characterization as a process value. In the case of majority rule, one
would try to show that the society generally espouses majority rule.
Obviously, if one can show that the society not only generally
espouses process values, but also generally espouses the particular
process value at hand, the case for concluding that the process is
intended to secure this value is greatly strengthened.
Third, it may be possible to cite evidence that members of the
society regularly criticize departures from or infringements upon
the value in question, even when the process outcome is good.
Various explanations of such critical behavior are possible. It could
be that the process is prized as securing a process value and not
merely as a means to desired outcomes. An alternative explanation
might be that the critics prize the process merely as a means to
desired outcomes and object to the infringement simply because of
a fear that the general quality of outcomes in the future will
decline. At least in the case of some process values, the force of this
alternative explanation will be inherently weak. Thus, where the
process features securing the value are ones which fall far short of
constituting any kind of guarantee of good outcome, it is not very
plausible to say that the criticism is merely outcome oriented.
Criticism of departure from majority rule happens to be a good
example, since majority rule is not itself much of a guarantor of
good outcomes. 98
As a corollary to this third type of argument, it may be possible
to cite evidence that relevant members of society regularly criticize
twice, not once, Ohen officials depart from or ignore a process value
and bad outcomes occur at the same time. The fact that two
criticisms-and not one-are typically heard, may indicate that the
98 Consider the discussion of "future results" skepticism at text accompanying note 65
upra.
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critics espouse the process not merely as a means to desired
outcomes but as securing a process value, too.
Fourth, it may be possible to construct strong analogical argu-
ments to show that the process in question is intended to serve a
process value. If, for example, majority rule is intended to secure a
process value in a legal process closely analogous to the one in
question, it can be argued with some force that process designers
probably intended the same in the instant situation.
Fifth, it is always possible to convert the issue from an "is"
question to an "ought to be" question. That is, the process design-
ers ought to be viewed as intending that the process implement
relevant process values, even though the evidence is at best am-
biguous. A great many legal arguments purportedly of the form,
"A is B" are, realistically viewed, arguments that "A ought to be
considered a B and therefore is a B." And on one view of the
nature of law itself, this is as it ought to be.99
D. Means of Determining Whether a Process Value Has Been Infringed
in a Particular Instance
Assuming that given features are designed to secure a process
value, it generally should not be difficult to tell whether or not the
value has been infringed in particular cases. Usually this factual
issue will simply call for an inquiry into whether a particular legal
rule or other legal precept securing the value has been broken.
It is important to recognize, however, that process values may
be disregarded even though no legal rule or precept is infringed.
Process designers may simply ignore a relevant process value in
designing the features of the process. For example, a .driver's
license revocation process might be set up without providing the
licensee any right to a hearing. It would be appropriate to con-
demn such a process as one that disregards .an important process
value.
There should be no need to set up a separate body called the
"Board for Determining Particular Process Value Infringements."
Rather, the very processes involved can provide their own "ad-
junct" procedures for determining (1) whether features of a pro-
cess are designed to secure a process value, and (2) whether that
value has been infringed in the particular case. For example, the
parties to an adjudicative proceeding could also raise "process
99 See L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); Hart, Holmes' Positivism-An
Addendum, 64 HARv. L. REv. 929, 930 (1951).
[Vol. 60:1
LEGAL PROCESSES
value" issues (in both their factual and legal aspects) for adjudica-
tion in the ordinary way.
Are process values, at least in theory, easier to secure through
law than good results? It would appear so since their implementa-
tion only calls for rules and other norms prescribing that they shall
be implemented, and for correctiye mechanisms, sanctioning de-
vices, and the like. Generally it should not be as difficult to design
these as it is to design ways of securing good results as such. We
often do not know how to secure good results. Indeed, we often
cannot even agree on what results are good.
By way of summary, it may be useful to list the possible
respects in which we may be critical of a process from the "process
value point of view":
1. The process fails to prescribe the implementation of ap-
propriate process values.
2. The process prescribes inappropriate (or inappropriate
forms of) process values.
3. The process values prescribed by the process are left
highly ambiguous.
4. The process only imperfectly (e.g., sketchily) prescribes
process values.
5. The process does not embody the right means-end
hypothesis for prescribing appropriate process values (e.g.,
participation of the accused is prescribed, but no provision
is made for free counsel to indigents, or an impartial
tribunal is specified, but no institutional provision is made
to secure suspension of judgment until both sides are
heard).
6. The process fails to provide corrective mechanisms, sanc-
tioning devices, or the like.
7. The process fails to provide for recruitment of administra-
tive personnel sensitive to process values.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have sought to identify process values for what
they are. In legal ordering, man does not live by results alone. Yet
we often fail to recognize process values, and even when we do, we
tend to neglect or override them almost as if they were weightless.
Accordingly, I have entered a plea for process values. But in
dosing, I am mindful that there is much more to be said than I
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have been able to say. In particular, I have no fear that there will
be wanting thinkers who can improve upon my articulations of the
"value content" of process values, or formulate better responses to
the various forms of process value skepticism, or perhaps even
develop ways of assigning weights to process values. Indeed, it may
be that my basic approach to the entire topic can be shown to be
misconceived. Whatever the course of any future developments, it
will, for me, be gratifying if this Essay at least serves to sharpen our
awareness of process values.
